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1. Overview
We consider the following problem. A ﬁle of size s bits is to be stored on n disks. Our failure model assumes
that a potentially malicious adversary may choose after the ﬁle is stored less than half of the disks, and arbi-
trarily alter the data they store. The adversary is constrained in its computation power, which is assumed to be
polynomial. Note that this disk-corruption model is different from the classical fault model for error correcting
codes, in which individual bits experience faults independently. The goal is to store the ﬁle on the disks in such
as way that recovery of the ﬁle is possible despite the corruption with high probability, where probability is over
the choices of data alterations made by the adversary.
With guaranteed correct recovery, standard methods from coding theory indicate a lower bound of sn total
storage bits (on all disks together). However, if we allow negligible probability of error, more compact schemes
are possible (see a survey of known approaches in [1]).
More concretely, the probabilistic relaxation of the recovery guarantee allows the use of a cryptographically
secure hash function, such as the conjectured collision-resistant hash function SHA-1 [7], in order to probabilis-
tically ﬁngerprint data. This works as follows: During storage time, digests of certain data values are stored, such
that a polynomially bounded adversary has negligible probability of consistently modifying the data without
mismatching its digest. The probability of false-match is typically very small, e.g., 2−160 with SHA-1, and is not
dependent on other system parameters like n. Therefore, from here on, we neglect this probability of error in
our exposition, and simply say that if a certain data matches an (unaltered) pre-stored digest, then w.h.p. the
data is unaltered.
The scheme we previously suggested in [1] 1 requires ﬁngerprinting information of size O(n log n) bits. Our
scheme employs expander graphs for redundant cross-checking of ﬁngerprint values. Some of the techniques in
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[1] may have other applications. In particular, Theorem [1] [4.1] demonstrates the robustness of an LPS expander
[3] against deletion of half of the vertices, improving on the numerical constants of a similar result by Upfal in
[8].
In this addendum, we demonstrate a simple solution, which is an application of Merkle hash-trees [4,5]. The
solution is asymptotically as efﬁcient as the method in [1], works even for small n, and has much smaller (and
no hidden) constants. In the remainder of this exposition, we describe the building blocks of the solution and
combine them together to obtain the full scheme.
2. IDA
Denote the ﬁle to be stored by F , thus |F | = s bits. Rabin has proposed in [6] an Information Dispersal
Algorithm (IDA) for fault tolerant storage and for message dissemination. IDA makes use of Reed–Solomon
codes with the Berlekamp–Welch decoding (described in [2]), to store F on n disks as follows. We split the ﬁle
into n− t segments, each consisting of s/(n− t) bits, and think of these segments as representing a polynomial
of degree n− t − 1 over a ﬁnite ﬁeld F of cardinality p  2s/(n−t). The n pieces to store are the values of this
polynomial at n ﬁxed points of the ﬁeld F . Clearly we can reconstruct this polynomial from only n− t such
values. Since the total amount of space taken by n− t pieces is exactly s, the space overhead is clearly optimal.
The IDA protects a ﬁle against loss of information on up to t disks. However, if any of the obtained pieces
is altered, the integrity of the reconstructed document may be compromised. Moreover, a user obtaining such
an erroneous document has no way of detecting that an error has occurred, and may simply return erroneous
results undetectably.
The main idea of combining ﬁngerprinting with IDA is to somehow detect which pieces are corrupted using
the ﬁngerprints, discard them, and then apply IDA with the good ones. The remaining, uncorrupted pieces
sufﬁce to reconstruct the ﬁle.
Below, we denote by IDA(F , i) the i’th piece produced by the IDA, to be stored on the i’th disk.
3. Digests
We produce ﬁngerprints using a cryptographically secure hash function H , such as the conjectured collision-
resistant SHA-1 [7]. For any value v, in an unlimited range, H(v) has ﬁxed size (in bits). We denote this size by
|H |. We assume that it is computationally infeasible to ﬁnd two different values v and v′ such that H(v) = H(v′).
Typically, setting |H | to 160 bits sufﬁces to guarantee this today, e.g., with SHA-1, and hence we will assume this.
4. Merkle trees
AMerkle hash-tree over the values {IDA(F , 0), ..., IDA(F , n− 1)} is a binary tree, where the ith leaf corresponds
to the value IDA(F , i) to be stored on disk i. For simplicity, assume n = 2. Each internal node is identiﬁed by
a pair (i, j), where the level i is between 1..+ 1, and j ranges between 0..2+1−i − 1. The levels of the nodes are
ascending from bottom to top, such that the level of a leaf is 1 and the level of the root is + 1. We associate a
hash value with each node recursively as follows. The hash value associated with leaf i is the hash of IDA(F , i).
The hash associated with an internal node is the hash of the hashes of its children. Let h(i, j) denote the hash
value of node (i, j) then more precisely we have
(1) h(1, j) = H(IDA(F , j)), for j = 0..2 − 1.
(2) h(i, j) = H(h(i − 1, 2j), h(i − 1, 2j + 1)), for i = 2..+ 1, and j = 0..2+1−i − 1.
We now deﬁne the ﬁngerprint which is stored on disk i (in addition to the data piece IDA(F , i)). Let
〈b−1, ..., b0〉 be the binary representation of i using  = log2 n bits (from most to least signiﬁcant, going from
1116 N. Alon et al. / Information and Computation 205 (2007) 1114–1116
left to right). There is a unique ascending path from the leaf i in the hash-tree to the root (+ 1, 0), namely,
(1, i), (2, i/2), (3, i/4), ..., (+ 1, 0). In this path, for each 1  k  , the node (k , i/2(k−1)) is a child of
(k + 1, i/2k). The second child of (k + 1, i/2k) is the node (k , i/2k ∗ 2 + (1 − b(k−1))). We store on disk
i, together with IDA(F , i), the hash values of all siblings of the nodes on the path from leaf i to the root, and
h(+ 1, 0) – the hash value of the root. More precisely, deﬁne finger(i) = g(, i), h(+ 1, 0), and store it on disk
i, where g(·, ·) is constructed recursively as follows.
• g(0, i) = null.
• g(j, i) = g(j − 1, i), h(j, i/2j ∗ 2 + (1 − b(j−1))) for 1  j  .
The veriﬁcation predicate of an IDA share IDA(F , i) against the root value h(+ 1, 0) is naturally deﬁned as
the reverse of the above: we verify the share by calculating the hash values of the nodes along the path from leaf
i to the root, using the appropriate hash value of siblings of nodes on this path, stored in g(, i), and compare it
with h(+ 1, 0).
The main property achieved by the use of aMerkle tree over the IDA shares is the following. For any index i,
if a pair of data items (di , fi) passes the above veriﬁcation against h(+ 1, 0), then w.h.p. we have di ≡ IDA(F , i)
and fi = finger(i), i.e., these are the original IDA share and its ﬁngerprint.
5. Storage and retrieval
The storage of F is done by computing its IDA shares IDA(F , 0), . . ., IDA(F , n− 1), and the corresponding
ﬁngerprints finger(0), . . ., finger(n− 1), and storing IDA(F , i), finger(i) on disk i.
Retrieval is done by reading all disks, and recovering h(+ 1, 0) from a majority. Then for each disk i, we
perform the veriﬁcation test against h(+ 1, 0). If the calculated hash of the root equals to h(+ 1, 0) then we use
IDA(F , i) to recover the ﬁle. After a majority of the pieces are veriﬁed for correctness, the ﬁle content is restored
using IDA.
It is easy to see that w.h.p. all the IDA shares used in the retrieval are correct, and hence, w.h.p. the ﬁle is
correctly retrieved by our scheme.
6. Complexity
The storage complexity of the scheme is |H |(log n+ 1) bits of information per node not counting the IDA
storage. Thus the total storage for ﬁngerprinting veriﬁcation is O(n log n) bits. The computation costs are all
negligible compared with the erasure code manipulation.
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